WHO ARE THE ROHINGYA?
The question is simple, but answering it is complex. The Rohingya are an ethnic, religious, and linguistic minority group from the northern Rakhine state (Harvard Divinity School, 2021). They are distinct from the major Burman group and share cultural traits that are more similar to those of South Asia (Matisoff, 2023). The Rohingya are predominantly Muslims who claim to be the descendants of Indo-Aryans but assert their indigeneity to western Myanmar, having lived there since precolonial times (Blakemore, 2019). However, their origin and identity are highly debated among scholars.
C. R. Abrar citing
Nicolaus (1995) argues that the influx of Muslim traders from Afghanistan,
India, Persia, Turkey, and the Arabian Peninsula merged with the previous
Muslim community to form the Rohingya community, which brought about a distinct dialect known as the Rohingya
language. It is worth mentioning that the Rohingya language shares similarities with
the Chittagongian language in Bangladesh (M. Rahman,
2018).
The Rohingya population
is widely regarded as one of the most oppressed groups globally. (UNHCR, 2021).
They have been subjected to decades of ‘structural and direct violence’ in Myanmar,
being denied citizenship rights, freedom of movement, and other basic rights
that amount to genocide and crimes against humanity (A. A. Rahman & Rahman,
2019). Moreover, the Myanmar military and the
majority of Buddhists typically view them as ‘terrorists’ and ‘illegal
immigrants’ (Walton & Jerryson, 2021). Instances of the influx of people
into present-day Bangladesh predate modern state formation, dating back to as
early as 1796 (Albert, 2017). Since the establishment of Myanmar based on the
Westphalian System, the Rohingya people have experienced various forms of
direct, systemic, and structural violence and persecution, which have forced
them to flee their homeland on several occasions. Some of the major instances
of displacement occurred in 1948, 1978, 1991,
1992, 2012, 2016, and the most recent and massive wave in 2017 (UNHCR, 2021).
Figure : Map of Rakhine (former Arakan) state
of Myanmar
(Source : Map of Rakhine State-Wikipedia)
CONTESTED CLAIMS OF ROHINGYA'S ORIGIN
“There is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitutes at the same time power relations.” - Michael Foucault (1977)
History is contentious; it is almost always debated and
formulated. Where we start our account of history is essentially political.
Since history is a product of human creation, it can never be objective or
neutral because the author's structure or worldview always influences it.
Essentially, it is politics that
dictates where we start our history, what we want to include, and what we
deliberately exclude from our narrative. To portray a picture of the emergence
and history of the Rohingya is a critical task of political narration. At this
juncture, a quote from Edward Said’s
Orientalism (1978) about how “Knowledge, …….[is]used to justify the
difference between classes, races, sexes, and nations” becomes especially
relevant.
Since the formation of “Burma” in the 1947 constitution, the Rohingya community
has been “denied citizenship, freedom of movement, access to education, health
care, and other basic rights” (Abrar, 1995). Furthermore, they are subjected to
‘religious persecution’ as a Muslim minority in the country (Abrar, 1995). The
justification of these heinous acts of violence and discrimination has
connotations in the history and emergence of the Rohingya. Myanmar’s
government, whether military, civilian, military-civilian, or autocratic, has
held that the Rohingya are ‘illegal Pakistani’ and later ‘illegal Bengali
immigrants living in the territory of Myanmar (Abrar, 1995; Sohel, 2017).
Prompting this narrative is the general belief among the Myanmar population,
among a few other minority groups along
with the major Burman population, that they are indeed ‘illegal Bengali
migrants’(Leider, 2018). Whether this resulted from years of ‘brainwashing’ or
‘propaganda’ or resentment for the special patronage of the earlier
colonialists is a matter of debate. This imputed identity is not in concert with
the version of history the Rohingya ascribe to themselves, and this provides
our premise. The literature regarding the Rohingya’s ascribed identity to
themselves refers to various places, times, and historical timelines.
Although this study is not free from the above-mentioned preconceptions and historical structures, I strive to portray an accurate version of their emergence. To provide a credible historical account of their emergence and to examine all the claims of their background and context, I will try to briefly review the most relevant postulations of their origin and development.
The state of Arakan is imbued with
the history of Rohingya. Arakan (present-day Rakhine) is the long stretch of
land in the South-West of Myanmar at the crossroads between South and East Asia
(Abrar, 1995; Hasan et al., 2022). The name Arakan has both Persian and Arabic
origins, while the name ‘Rekkha Pura’ was given to Arakan by ancient Buddhist
preachers (Mohajan, 2019). The state of Rakhine extends 560 km from the coast
of Bangladesh to Irawaddi state in Myanmar (Sultana Niti, 2020). It is often
described as a ‘special case’ as it was neither included in the mainland nor
Burma proper (Uddin, 2012). Rather, many historical accounts refer to it as
‘extended Bengal’ (Uddin, 2012). The major ethnic group in the region is the
Rakhines, also known as the Arakanese. The Rakhines are an ethnic group
constituting 6% of Myanmar’s population (Sultana Niti, 2020). The bulk of
Arakanese Scholars contend that Arayans from the West first settled in the
area, while others maintain that the Tibeto-Burman group were the first
settlers in the area (Maung, 1989)
The coastal region of Arakan in
present-day Myanmar has been a site of conflict and migration for centuries.
However, starting from the 7th century up until the 14th century, traders from
a range of geographical locations stopped at the coast of Arakan on their
voyages to China and Southeast Asia and settled in the region (Tha, 1965). It
is claimed that the region was then introduced to Islam and impacted by various
cultures drawn from Arabs, Moors, Persians, and Turks, who formed the staple of
these voyagers. Reflecting the common trend of a voyage in that era, they
traversed the area principally for three reasons: proselytizing, trade, and to
conquer or wage war.
This is one of the several periods
where many Rohingya trace their ancestral origins. It is noteworthy that the
historical evidence of the claims before the 15th century Arakan is scarce and
disputed, but not negligible (Galen, 2008). This claim is not widely accepted
and is sometimes vehemently opposed by the Myanmar government, which holds that
Rohingya’s origins before 1824 are obsolete, and the major Muslim group that
ties to this supposed claim are the Kaman ethnic groups (Blakemore, 2019). A
significant observation to make here is that the Kaman group is also a Muslim
population in Myanmar, who, unlike the Rohingya, share similar cultural traits
with the major Burman group and are included in the nation’s 135 official ethnic
groups which attribute Citizenship to the Kamans (Leider, 2018, Chapter 9).
Another source of the claim of
Rohingya’s emergence refers to the period between the 13th and 19th centuries
(B B C News, 2017a). These are claims that as early as the 10th century AD(
specifically since the 13th century) to 1580, Arkan was under the influence of
the Muslim Sultanate of Bengal (Galen, 2008). This is a period where many
Rohingya and historians claim their origin (Farzana, 2017). Along with previous
claims, these are also repressed and denied by the Myanmar government. This claim is expanded by the bunch, who
claim that they are descendants of Arab traders from the 18th century. Further,
it is supplemented by the claim that the word “Rohingya” which is thought to
derive from the Arabic word Rahm, which signifies mercy (Mohajan, 2019). There
are significant stories that go along that Arab settlers settled on the Ramree
Island of Myanmar. Some versions state that the Arakanese monarch caught the
traders when their ship ran aground on the island and gave the order to have
them killed (Sohel, 2017). The merchants then shouted "Rahma" in a
cry for forgiveness, which eventually became the name of the area and the
populace. While other historians claim that the Arakanese king welcomed these
traders, granted them important posts, and let them intermarry with the native
populace and the traders altered the region's culture and language while also
introducing Islam (Sohel, 2017).
Further dispersing and complicating
the claims to origin, some state they are descendants of slaves that were
brought in the 16th century(Abrar, 1995). During the 16th century, the
Arakanese learned the basics of sailing techniques through interactions with
Portuguese settlers, who were engaged in piracy along the coast of the
present-day Bay of Bengal(Abrar, 1995). They brought slaves from lower Bengal,
who were then used as slaves for farming and other labor. Although the
Arakanese and Rohingyas refer to these enslaved people as Heins, which means
low-caste, Nicolaus suggests that they identify as Rohingyas(Abrar, 1995).
Mohajan (2019) infers that the
origin of the word “Rohingya” is the Ruha people, who came from Afghanistan. He
further suggests that the word “Rohingya” could be derived from the Sanskrit
word “Roh”, meaning “mountain”, from a mountainous region in northwest India
called Roh.
Some historians and activists
suggest that the Rohingya identity is a political invention and a play of
identity politics based on a common religious identity. They argue that the
term was coined by Muslim leaders in the 1950s who were in Rakhine State and
sought an autonomous Muslim region and political rights (Tha Hla, 2009). They
assert that the Rohingya do not constitute a distinct ethnic group but rather a
collection of different Muslim groups that migrated primarily from Bengal and
other regions at different times. This has some similarity with Nicolaus’
suggestion that the Rohingya “are the descendants of Muslim Arabs, Moors,
Persians, Turks, Mughals, and Bengalis who came mostly as traders, warriors,
and saints through overland and sea routes” that morphed to form the Rohingya
community (Abrar, 1995).
According to Mohajan (2019), there
exists a classification of Muslims residing in Arakan that may be divided into
four distinct groupings.
1) The Chittagonian Bengalis who
currently reside on the Mayo Frontier region.
2) The descendants of the Muslim
community of Arakan during the Mrauk-U Period (1430–1784) who currently inhabit
the Mrauk-U and Kyauktow townships.
3) The offspring of the Arab
mercenaries originating from Ramree Island.
4) The Muslim population from the
Myedo area of Upper Burma who chose to remain in Arakan subsequent to the
Burmese conquest in 1784.
The military junta of Myanmar makes
a claim that is distinct from all others. The government of Myanmar asserts
that the Rohingya people do not possess indigenous status in Myanmar but are
rather ‘illegal migrants’ from Bengal who have no historical or legal claim to
citizenship or political rights (OHCHR, 2023). They further deny that the word
Rohingya has a historical or linguistic origin in Rakhine State. Contrary to
Myanmar’s claim, there are indeed many historical remnants of the Rohingya
people’s origins in the region before 1824 (Smith, 2021).
As Arakan has been a crossroads
between kingdoms and cultures for centuries, historically, the region, along
with parts of present-day Bangladesh, has changed hands quite a lot between
Assam, Bengal, and Arakan rulers (Hasan et al., 2022). Within the lenses of
constructivism, porous borders can shape the identities and norms of states by
allowing them to exchange and adopt ideas from each other. In this case, it can
thus be said that cultures and kingdoms are not static or predefined units with
fixed interests but rather social agents that are affected by their relations
with others. Consequentially, the interaction has considerably altered the
culture of the region to make it more South Asian than other parts of Burma,
especially the north-western part of Arakan (Barnett, 2018). It is significant,
however, that the region had the most interaction with the West, now
Bangladesh, which, argumentatively in theory, poses threat to the modern
concept of nation-state for Myanmar.
I find that the Rohingya’s search
and struggle for independence and resistance to Burman rule can at least be
traced to the 16th century (Abrar, 1995). Until the 16th century, Arakan was an
independent Kingdom, made unstable by King Chandrasudharma’s death in 1684.
However, until the period when Arkan was conquered and put under Burman
kingship, the Muslims in the region had considerable influence in the ‘making
and overthrowing’ of kings in the region (Abrar, 1995). Recounting the
historical work of Phayre (1884) Chowdhury says that Arakan was a sovereign
kingdom until 1784 AD (Abrar, 1995, p. 23). It is one of the period that the
Rohingya assertion of their political rights was threatened. The Burmans were
ruthless in their pursuit of Arakan and futile attempts at breaking the Burman
rule since 1985 were met with ruthless and murderous reprisals. The onset of
such ruthless reprisal led to the first influx from Arakan to
British-administered Bengal, as the settlers of the present Cox’s Bazar area
are thought to be descendants from this period. Even the name of the region
derives from the superintendent of rehabilitation of refugees Hiram Cox (Abrar,
1995). The incorporation of Arakan into the Burman kingdom juxtaposed it with
British India. The refugees that settled in the region waged guerilla warfare
against the Bhama King and provoked Burmese incursions into British Indian
territory which culminated in the start of a spiral of three separate wars. In the
1st Anglo-Burmese War(1824-26) the British annexed Arakan and Tennasserim
(Pollak, 1974). It ended with the Treaty of Yandaboo (Pollak, 1974). The 2nd
Anglo-Burmese War (1852 –1853) followed after Burma allegedly violated the
Yandaboo treaty, in which the British annexed the Pegu province, the entire
lower Burma (Pollak, 1974). The 3rd Anglo-Burmese War erupted in 1885 with
British suspicion of emerging relations between the French and Burma, chiefly
on account of the underlying British desire to complete the annexation of Burma
(Pollak, 1974). Through the 3rd War, the British gained control over the entire
Burma. In these wars, the British were aided in their pursuit by the Rohingya.
The Rohingya received education and employment opportunities in colonial
administration, police, and the military; they received land grants in exchange
for their loyalty and service (Albert, 2017; M. R. Islam et al., 2020). There was widespread resentment among the
other ethnic groups in Myanmar, who viewed the Rohingya as traitors and
foreigners. The British ruled Myanmar within British India up until 1937, when
it became a separate colony. However,
the Rohingya equation became a strategic priority to the British with Japanese
incursions in the area during the 2nd World War as “the Rohingya were loyal to
the British, rendering valuable services in work units, reconnaissance, and
espionage, while their Buddhist counterparts, the Rakhines, look the side of
the Japanese” (Abrar, 1995, p. 6). There is a wrangling of viewpoints in the
literature over the assertion that the Rakhines were pro-Japanese and the
Rohingyas were pro-British during the war and that both groups committed
massacres against each other (Sarkar, 2019). Some sources state that the
Rohingyas were loyal to the British and received arms and training from them,
while the Rakhines and other Burmese nationalists welcomed the Japanese
invasion as a way of ending British colonial rule (Sarkar, 2019). However, it
may also be argued that both the Rakhines and Rohingyas were subjected to the
consequences of British divide and rule strategies as well as Japanese empire
expansionist aspirations that later continued through the military regime's
Burmanization policies.
In 1948, Burma got its independence
from the British (Saha, 2001). As decolonization of former colonies was often
hectic and, on many occasions, left matrices of violence along ethnic and
religious lines. In the case of Myanmar, as it later turned out, it left out
genocidal intent, which started unfolding with the military regime. Abrar,
citing Yeager, claims that during the second world war the British promised the
Rohingya an autonomous region in return for their assistance, which the British
had no intention of fulfilling. Although
this was never officially confirmed or fulfilled by the British (Abrar, 1995).
As previously mentioned, the Second
World War created a rift between the Arakan and the Rohingya people. In 1949, U
Nu assumed the position of prime minister (M. M. Rahman, 2017). Despite his
prior role as the foreign minister of Ba Maw's pro-Japanese government during
the war, he demonstrated a departure from his previous association by
recognizing the Rohingya as an ethnic minority within Myanmar. (Rohingya History, 2018). In 1960, before
being re-elected to office, he promised state status to the Arakan Party, which
represented the Arakanese Buddhists. This was opposed by the Rohingya people,
who had fought against the pro-Japanese force and historically held animosities
against the Arakanese Buddhists (Ibrahim, 2016; Uddin, 2021).
To resolve this conflict, Burmese
health minister Sultan Mahmud of U Nu’s government, elected as an MP from
Buthidaung North, proposed a state for
the Muslims of ‘Bengali origin’ in the northern part of Arakan, where the Rohingya
were concentrated (Uddin, 2021). He proposed the utilization of the Kaladan
River as the demarcation line between the Arakan regions with a Muslim majority
and those with a Buddhist majority. Subsequently, the idea was formally
presented to the Statehood Consultative Committee. Mahmud posited that
individuals of Bengali descent who identify as Muslims would be amenable to the
notion of a unified state alongside Arakanese Buddhists, provided that
sufficient safeguards and inclusive political representation were in place. In
the event that sufficient safeguards were unattainable, Mahmud suggested the
direct administration of a distinct northern Arakan zone from the country's
capital, Rangoon (Rohingya History,
2018).
On May 1, 1961, Prime Minister U Nu
executed the proposals proposed by Mahmud, but he did not extend the new zone
up to the Kaladan River. Instead, he created a Mayu Frontier Administration
that was comprised of Muslim-majority Rohingya people and remained separate
from an Arakan State (Albert, 2018; Leider, 2020). This gave a separate
regional entity to the Rohingya under the capital Yangon administration and
also provided space for U Nu’s government to make an Arakan state.
However, this arrangement was
short-lived, as a military coup in 1962 changed the political course of Myanmar
forever. The coup by General Ne Win resulted in the reversal of reforms
implemented by U Nu undoing the recognition and rights of the Rohingya
population. (M. R. Islam, 2017). Additionally, he had to confront a
guerrilla-style uprising from certain Rohingya leaders who wished to establish
their identity in opposition to its predominately Buddhist population (Leider,
2018).
The process of dehumanizing the
Rohingya has accelerated since the 1960s (Blinken, 2021). The Rohingya’s
Mujahid Rebellion also divided the Muslim population in Arakan, as some
supported more moderate political endeavors (Abrar, 1995). In 1964, the
military council dissolved the Mayu Froniter Administration and added the area
to the Arakan Administration. During the decade, nearly all of the border
regions were extremely unstable. The military’s hardline and strategic response
to all these insurgent movements was brute force. The military government's
acts targeting the Rohingya population have served to bolster the resolve of
the Mujahid revolution. Further Islamic militancy made the intentions of the
Islamic community in Myanmar more suspicious and, as previously mentioned,
bifurcated the community as some moderate Islamic groups were willing to take
up arms against the rebellion and Islamic militancy. In 1965, the Burmese
government launched the Burmanization campaign to naturalize all Burmese
citizens into the major Burman group (Leider, 2018). This cornered the ethnic
groups into the frontier zones, where they held firm political, economic, and
military control. By 1974, the Burmese government had enacted a new
constitution that declared Buddhism the state religion and recognized 135
ethnic groups as citizens of Burma. The Rohingya were left off Burma's list of
the 135 national groups it recognized, depriving them of citizenship and
fundamental rights (B B C News, 2017b; Human Rights Watch, 2022; Leider,
2018).
In the 1970s, Rohingya militants
organized themselves into a political and armed group to fight for an
autonomous Muslim zone. The group, which was initially called the Rohingya
Liberation Army (RLA) in 1972, changed its name to the Rohingya Patriotic Front
(RPF) in 1974 (Lintner, 1999). The RPF carried out guerrilla attacks against the
Burmese security forces and Buddhist villages but had limited success and
support from some segments of the Muslim community (The Gender Security
Project, 2020). In response to these attacks, the Government of Myanmar
launched Operation Dragon King (Operation Nagmin) in 1978 to officially
record the residents of northern Rakhine state and relocate individuals deemed
as "foreigners," predominantly the Rohingya population, from the
region ahead of a nationwide population survey.(Constantine, 2012). In February
1978, the Tatmadaw (Burmese army) and immigration officials carried out the
operation in areas where Rohingyas predominated. The operation involved mass
arrests, persecution, and horrific violence against imputed “illegal immigrants” (Medicines Sans Frontieres,
2019). To escape from the violence, some 200,000 to 250,000 Rohingyas fled into
Bangladesh, where they faced dire humanitarian conditions in refugee camps
(Medicines Sans Frontieres, 2019). This was the first instance of a Rohingya
influx into modern-day Bangladesh. Human rights organizations and the
international community widely denounced the operation as an ethnic cleansing
campaign (UN in Myanmar, 2019).
In 1982, Burma enacted the 1982
Citizenship Legislation, which effectively rendered stateless all Rohingya
people living in Burma, especially those who lived in Burma prior to 1824. Many
Rohingya people held ration cards from the British era, which were somewhat
forcibly taken from them in exchange for ‘white cards’ that required them identify
themselves as ‘illegal immigrants’ from Bangladesh living in Burma (Brinham,
2018).
Between April 1991 and May 1992,
Bangladesh faced a second wave of Rohingya influxes. Human Rights Watch listed
increased military presence and repression as the causes of refugee flow
(ACAPS, 2017). These factors compelled them to escape and seek asylum in
Bangladesh due to a range of deep causes, including but not limited to
involuntary labor, forced relocation, sexual violence, summary killings, and
torture, along with the emergence of Buddhist nationalism and ethnic conflicts
in Rakhine state, among other contributing factors.
In 2012, another influx, albeit a
smaller number, of Rohingya refugees occurred. This was caused by the 2012
Rakhine State riots, which broke out in June and October. The riots started
after three Rohingya men raped and killed a Rakhine woman in May, and a Rakhine
mob killed ten Muslims in revenge (M. R. Islam et al., 2020). The violence
killed more than 200 people and displaced about 140,000 people, mostly
Rohingya, who were trapped in camps or ghettos in Rakhine state (Influx of
Rohingya (M. R. Islam et al., 2020). However, in this instance, Bangladesh
allegedly pushed back the Rohingya, who escaped to Bangladesh to seek refuge.
There was a lack of shelter, food, water, sanitation, health care, and
protection in the camps in Bangladesh (UNFPA, 2020). Bangladesh also complained
as the Rohingya threatened the national security of Bangladesh and put strain
on the country’s resources (UNFPA, 2020).
The Rohingya crisis in Myanmar has
been exacerbated by a cycle of violence between the government and the Arakan
Rohingya Salvation Army since the beginning of the second decade of the 21st
century (ARSA) (B B C Indonesia, 2017; Shukla, 2021). The group emerged in
response to the historical struggle against Tatmadaw’s repression of the
Rohingya people (Source). The 2016 Rohingya influx was precipitated by a militant attack by ARSA on
three Myanmar security posts that killed nine police personnel (B B C News,
2017c). Myanmar's military government responded with a harsh counter-insurgency
operation that involved rape, arson, torture, persecution, and forced
displacement of the Rohingya (Edroos, 2017). Consequently, 87,000 Rohingya
people escaped to Bangladesh from 2016 to July 2017, where they joined the
existing Rohingya population that faced severe hardships in Myanmar (B B C
News, 2020).
The Tatmadaw’s response to the
insurgency intensified the resolve of ARSA. On August 25, 2017, ARSA operatives and its Rohingya allies
allegedly assaulted 30 security installations, comprising border posts and a
military base, and killed more than 12 Burmese security forces which led
Tatmadaw to initiate a swift “clearance operation”, mobilizing over 70
battalions of around 30,000–35,000 soldiers into Rakhine State (B B C News,
2017c). The clearance operation ceased on September 5, 2017 (B B C News, 2017c;
Edroos, 2017). It caused the biggest influx of Refugee flows, surpassing all
previous flows into Bangladesh (B B C News, 2017c). More than 600,000 Rohingya
to fled to Bangladesh, as well as undetermined number of Rakhine, Rohingya,
Hindu, Magyi, Mro, and Thet were displaced within Rakhine State (B B C News,
2017c, 2020). The root cause of the refugee influx was the historical
marginalization and persecution of the Rohingya people as well as the brutal
military operation and the militant insurgency (Abrar 1995).
Currently, Bangladesh hosts over 860,000 Rohingya refugees, constituting one of the largest and most protracted refugee situations globally (Fairooz, 2022; M. T. Islam, 2018). They are exposed to serious threats to their HS, which entails the protection of people from critical and pervasive threats to their survival, dignity, and livelihoods (Fairooz, 2022; M. T. Islam, 2018). Only 30,000 refugees have refugee status in Bangladesh and most without refugee status live in precarious and dire conditions(M. T. Islam, 2018). Furthermore, they a discriminatory traditional ‘majhi structure’ of society in the camps (M. T. Islam, 2018). The Bangladesh government also favors dealing with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) rather than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on refugee matters (Fairooz, 2022). In the camps, the Rohingya face disease outbreaks, natural disasters, trafficking and exploitation, and restrictions on their livelihoods, movement, and education.
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