DOES HUMAN SECURITY(HS) BRING ANYTHING NEW TO REFUEE PROTECTION?
A salient question in the search for meaning for physical security
that has reoriented or at least given preponderance to HS since the Cold War
was “Whose security?”. This is a question that has been asked repeatedly in
security discourse. However, the previous realist assertion was no longer
viable in the century to come. The reorientation of security was in some sense
necessary at that time, at least to rub along with the democratic consensus to
cut down funding for physical security. A shift in orientation from state to
individual or community, at least in normative advocacy, seemed to make up for
the vacuum (Paris, 2001). Although in reality all this normative advocacy made
little sense in policy application, David Chandler opinioned that human security
as a concept did not ‘bark’ (Chandler, 2008). Its natural progression of time
reached its end. Such was the lifetime of a neologism. However, it is my
opinion that HS is alive and well. A cursory search at Google scholar shows
that in the period between 1990-2000, 2000-2010 & 2010-2020 the term HS has
appeared in papers, respectively, 4090, 21,100 & 66,600 times. Moreover, it
is imperative to say that many of the ‘old wines’ that had been previously
rebottled in HS container has elevated their status and focused on the
individual.
However, it is not human security, but human insecurity that
dominates the news. HS discourse continues to have normative appeal, but why
has it not been able to yield a satisfactory result? It is my assertion that
independent research into HS continued to spark interest among academia and
enthusiasts, but practical effort has been on the decline. The COVID-19
generated new interest among academia, even the UNDP published a report on HS
after a decade, steering itself substantially in a different direction from the
former Human Security Project (UNDP & HDRO, 2021).
It is further, not possible to pin down a reason for HS failure.
There are also questions as why HS did not spark much interest in refugee
protection and how much of this responsibility has been handed down to the
human rights law?
Legal recourse through the human rights framework remains
promising as most of it concerns how to bring justice to the perpetrators,
contingent upon the discretion of this state and consequently steering away
from addressing the root causes of human suffering. I postulate the following
reasons for the conventionality of HS.
First, HS has different imperatives: a broad version, a narrow
militaristic version, a focus on development, a focus on macro indicators of
growth, an interventionist framework, and imperatives that emphasize freedom
from fear or freedom from want. Few conceptions even claim to be exclusive.
This divergence of views without policy actualization stretched HS from reality
to have any analytical coherence.
Second, the freedom from want approach is very broad, and
consequentially shortening it down for practical reasons to have an empirical
measure only makes it a palliative measure that works within the philosophy of
market liberalism (Chandler, 2008).
Third, in many cases, international legalism provides an
avenue for short-term resolution, while HS brings normative calls for change.
In the case of refugee issues, it helps address the issue but does little to
bring a long-term solution to the problem.
Fourth, often HS takes a very limited developmental route that
compromises other approaches. As an example, Japan's efforts toward freedom
from want, while very broad, are narrowly focused on the development assistance
agenda.
Fifth, certain historical events jerked the concept, often
regressing progress away from justice and security. The September 11 incidents
gave rise to a very state-centered view towards HS.
Sixth, the definition of HS is omnivorous, which lacks rigid
conceptual boundaries. The lack of conciseness of its definition is one of the
main problems. A number of academics have offered definitions depending on the
breadth and scope, with different emphasis.
Seventh, the non-binding nature of HS can undermine legal guarantees.
As many states sidestepped their legal obligation about the rights of refugees,
a HS framework can be taken as an eyewash for a ‘much ado for nothing’ policy,
being skewed out of proportion.
My Eighth and final critique of HS is the securitization issue of
HS. In the Cold War, securitization of the issue rendered importance on the
political agenda. However, unnecessary securitization of an issue can
potentially backfires as it involves assumptions of antagonistic relations and
non-tradable interests where societal securitization ‘can induce fear driven
responses and xenophobic othering’ of refugees vis-à-vis the national community
on whose resource the refugees depend on.
Furthermore, David Chandler (2008) lists three reasons why HS did
not live up to its potential. These are-
First, he asserted that the threats of the Cold War were
exaggerated out of proportion, and it was thought that securitization of other
aspects of life would devote much-needed attention.
Second, he asserts that many of the problems of insecurity were
rendered to the developing world, and it was an attempt to securitize the
developing world through a very narrow state-centric-military approach.
Finally, the Cold War left a void in clear strategic policymaking,
which was replenished by the securitization of short-term goals that were
merely sustainable.
In my opinion for human security to be meaningful in every sphere
including refugee protection, it must focus on, As L. Axworthy (2018) points
out--
“Security of the people, not just territory
Security of individuals, not just nation
Security through development, not through arms
Security of all people everywhere, in their homes, in their jobs,
in their communities, and in their environment”